The satellites that Europe depends on for navigation, weather, and military communications are targets. The question is who is mapping the threat.
Dr. Thomas Withington is a Research Associate at the Royal United Services Institute, the London-based defense think tank founded in 1831 by the Duke of Wellington, and a Senior Non-Resident Associate Fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome. He specializes in electronic warfare, radar, and military communications: the electromagnetic domain where modern counterspace operations begin. His work spans analysis, consulting, and field research in operational theaters including Ukraine, the Middle East, and the southern Mediterranean. He provides regular commentary on the security dimensions of electromagnetic spectrum use for defense and media organizations worldwide.
The counterspace threat is not theoretical. In May 2026, Withington authored a detailed analysis of the Secure World Foundation’s annual Global Counterspace Capabilities report for Armada International, tracking how 13 nations are developing electronic warfare tools designed to degrade, deny, or deceive satellite systems. The technologies range from GNSS jamming and spoofing to uplink interference targeting communications satellites. SatNews reported in March 2026 on a 50 percent surge in GNSS interference incidents detected across Marlink’s maritime customer base, a trend driven by state-level jamming operations in the Baltic, Black Sea, and eastern Mediterranean. In April 2026, SatNews examined the rise of grey zone satellites, where the ambiguity between civilian and military functions has become a tactical advantage. In February 2026, Germany committed €35 billion to LEO resilience and non-kinetic deterrence through 2030, a signal that Europe’s approach to space defense is shifting from declaratory to operational.
For the European smallsat sector, the implications are structural. Constellations designed for commercial Earth observation, IoT connectivity, and meteorology share orbital regimes with military assets and face the same electromagnetic environment. The line between commercial vulnerability and defense requirement is dissolving. Withington’s analytical focus sits at that intersection: tracking which nations are building counterspace electronic warfare capability, and what that means for the operators, institutions, and insurers who depend on uninterrupted satellite services.
At SmallSat Europe, Withington brings the defense-stage perspective of an analyst who has studied electronic warfare across land, sea, air, and space domains. The audience includes operators who need to understand the threat environment their satellites inhabit, and defense officials evaluating what resilience actually requires.
The satellites work until someone decides they shouldn’t. Withington tracks who has the tools.
