The GAO has found that a long-standing problem in DoD space acquisitions is that program and unit costs tend to go up significantly from initial cost estimates, while in some cases, the capability that was to be produced declines. This problem persists.
However, DoD has made progress on several of its high-risk space programs and is expecting to launch new generations of satellites across various missions over the next 12 months that should significantly advance some capabilities, particularly protected communications and space surveillance. While DOD is having success in readying some satellites for launch, other space acquisition programs currently in development face challenges that could further increase costs and delay targeted delivery dates.
Another risk facing DoD space programs over the next few years is the potential for launch delays due to changes being made in the launch sector as well as an increase in the demand for certain DOD launch vehicles. The GAO’s past work has identified a number of causes for the cost growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out.
First, on a broad scale, DoD starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and, for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess potentially more executable alternatives.
Second, DoD has tended to start its space programs too early, that is, before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. This tendency is caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on proving technologies.
Third, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full capability.
DoD has been working to ensure that its space programs are more executable and produce a better return on investment. Some actions DoD and others have adopted or are pursuing include: the Acquisition Improvement Plan, which lists five initiatives for improving how the Air Force obtains new capabilities; changes in cost estimating that are in line with earlier GAO recommendations; and the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, which was signed into law in May 2009.
However, there are still significant changes to processes, policies, and support needed to ensure reforms can take hold. Recent studies and reviews that have examined national security space have all found that diffuse leadership has a direct impact on the space acquisition process, primarily because it makes it difficult to hold any one person or organization accountable, and there is no single authority to resolve conflicts among the many organizations involved in space programs. Moreover, DOD continues to face gaps in critical technical and program expertise for space. Until both issues are resolved, commitment to reforms may not be sustainable.
